Court Fees

A Beis Din is not merely a forum for dispute resolution; it is a sacred institution rooted in the very fabric of our Torah. When individuals enter a Beis Din, they are not stepping into a secular courtroom but into a מקום קדוש, a holy place, “ה׳ נצב בעדת־קל”[1], governed by Jewish law based primarily in Choshen Mishpat, the divinely ordained system of civil law that reflects the will of Hashem in matters between אדם לחבירו fellow human beings. The sanctity of Beis Din demands seriousness, integrity, and responsibility from all who appear before it, be it the Plaintiff and or the Defendant. The Torah itself commands, “ואלה המשפטים אשר תשים לפניהם”[2], placing civil law at the forefront of covenantal life, teaching that justice between individuals is itself Divine service.

Paying for Beis Din is not a commercial transaction but an expression of Kovod HaTorah respect for the mitzvah of our holy Torah. Our Sages teach that judges may not accept payment for judging itself[3], yet they may receive שכר בטלה compensation for the time they forgo from their personal livelihood in order to serve Klal Yisrael[4]. This distinction preserves the purity of judgment while protecting the dignity of the Dayanim. The codifiers in Choshen Mishpat carefully articulate this balance, ensuring that Torah justice remains uncompromised while those who dedicate themselves to it are not financially harmed[5]. When parties fulfill their financial obligations promptly and respectfully, they demonstrate that they understand the weight of the process. Those who invest in the process tend to pay closer attention to it. Payment fosters accountability. It reflects that the litigants recognize the sacrifice of the Dayanim and value the seriousness of Torah adjudication.

A case does not simply surface without cause. When a dispute reaches Beis Din, it generally signals that something has broken down: a financial obligation unmet, an agreement violated, trust eroded, or communication failed. People do not ordinarily summon one another lightly. Prior mediation and arrangements are always strongly encouraged before coming to Beis Din, including righting the wrong, for the Torah praises peace and compromise when possible[6]. While guilt is never presumed and each side must be heard fully and fairly, the very presence of a case suggests that responsibility must be examined. The Torah commands, “בצדק תשפוט עמיתך”[7], obligating judges to evaluate matters with righteousness and impartiality. Beis Din exists precisely for these moments, to restore balance and clarify אמת truth within the framework of halacha.

It is, therefore, deeply inappropriate to treat Beis Din casually or manipulatively. To delay proceedings unnecessarily, to refuse to pay required fees, to use Beis Din as a tactic for pressure, or to ignore its rulings is to misuse Torah itself. Choshen Mishpat is not a tool for gamesmanship. It is a system of justice rooted in Divine wisdom. The Torah warns, “לא תטה משפט”[8], do not pervert justice. When litigants attempt to take advantage of the process, they erode not only their own credibility but the communal trust that sustains Torah society. A Beis Din’s authority rests not on force, but on collective reverence for Torah law.

Justice in the Torah is compassionate, but it is not permissive of wrongdoing. Consequences are part of holiness. When wrong has occurred, restitution and accountability are necessary to repair harm and protect the integrity of the community as a whole. The Torah commands, “צדק צדק תרדוף”[9] — justice shall you pursue — not selectively and not sentimentally, but steadfastly. A Beis Din that fails to enforce rulings undermines the very דין rule of law, which it is meant to uphold. At the same time, the codifiers praise compromise when appropriate, recognizing that שלום peace is one of the highest Torah values[10]. The Mishnah teaches, “על שלשה דברים העולם עומד… על הדין ועל האמת ועל השלום”[11] — אמת and שלום are not opposites but partners. Properly administered דין produces lasting שלום.

Beis Din stands in continuity with Moshe Rabbeinu judging the people in the wilderness[12]. It is a living fulfillment of “ואלה המשפטים אשר תשים לפניהם.” When two Jews submit their dispute to Torah adjudication, they declare that the Ribbono Shel Olam governs not only their prayers and rituals, but their contracts, partnerships, and financial dealings. They bring Hashem into their conflict, transforming contention into an opportunity for sanctification. The Rambam writes that it is a positive commandment to appoint judges and officers in every community of Israel[13], underscoring that justice is not peripheral but central to Jewish life.

To honor Beis Din is to honor the Torah. To pay its fees responsibly, to speak respectfully, to accept its rulings with dignity — these are not mere procedural details. They are acts of avodas Hashem, no less than paying for doctor bills, purchasing maror for Pesach, or acquiring a Megillas Eicha for Tish B’Av. Indeed, if one is wise (and pious) enough to perceive it, appearing before Beis Din with integrity is akin to the mitzvah of buying oneself an esrog on Sukkos, or the sanctified observances of drinking spirits on Purim, Pesach, Shabbos, and Yom Tov — tangible expressions of loyalty to Hashem’s will, with joy.

In a world where disputes often escalate into hostility and public discord, Beis Din remains a holy and peaceful place where matters are addressed with structure, fairness, and reverence for Divine law. It is not merely a place of judgment but a place of prevention, crime prevention through moral clarity, communal preservation through accountability, and spiritual refinement through submission and acceptance of Torah authority – the will and wisdom of Hashem. One should not see Beis Din as punishment, but as a tremendous mitzvah, a blatant opportunity to do what is right in the eyes of Hashem and man, fulfilling “והייתם נקיים מה׳ ומישראל”[14]. When treated properly, Beis Din does not merely resolve conflict; it elevates it, restoring not only justice but the spiritual equilibrium of those involved. A Beis Din is the place to tap into your essence of your Neshama, and to find a way to do what is righteous.

Answer

The question of liability for legal expenses arises in almost every Beis Din proceeding and has been discussed in multiple contexts. Often enough secular courts customarily require the losing party to pay court costs as a matter of routine. In contrast, rabbinical courts operating according to Halachah do not automatically obligate the losing party to pay expenses, but only in specific circumstances, which were elaborated upon in other chapters of the position paper on this subject.

Rabbinical courts confront two different needs: on the one hand, there is a need to protect a litigant whose counterpart has caused him to incur expenses through improper conduct; on the other hand, there is a need to establish a systematic and principled policy regarding legal expenses.

Halacha distinguishes between (1) court expenses, such as maintenance of the court and related administrative costs, which are imposed equally upon both parties, and (2) the plaintiff’s expenses, such as attorney’s fees, which the defendant is generally exempt from paying. We will begin by clarifying the distinction between these two types of expenses and defining them and then discuss the cases in which the defendant is obligated to pay expenses according to Halachah.

The halachic discussion includes several dimensions: the basic halachic law, the level of communal enactments (takkanos), and contractual undertakings to reimburse legal expenses.

1. Court Expenses

It is agreed that court expenses are divided equally by both parties, as written in SA CM 9,5 and 13,3 and expounded upon by the Rivash (Responsa §475): “Know that the scribe’s fee for writing the claims must be paid by both parties… and this includes all expenses required by the judges in issuing their ruling, such as if they needed to consult…” Similarly ruled the Piskei Din Rabbaniyim (Vol. 6, p. 84): Although we cited above that the party found liable in judgment does not pay the opposing party’s expenses, it appears that court fees must indeed be paid by both sides. As ruled in Choshen Mishpat 13:3, both parties pay the scribe’s fee for writing the claims. Accordingly, the same applies to Beis Din/court fees in monetary cases, both are obligated.

2. The Plaintiff’s Expenses

Regarding the plaintiff’s expenses, the Gemara (Sanhedrin 31b) states: When Rav Dimi came, Rabbi Yochanan said: If one litigant says, “Let us adjudicate here,” and the other says, “Let us go to the central court,” he may be compelled to go to the central court. Rabbi Elazar said before him: “Rabbi, should one who is owed a maneh spend another maneh to collect it?” Rather, he is compelled to adjudicate in his own city.

Meaning, the plaintiff cannot be forced to litigate elsewhere, since he would incur travel expenses. From here, Tosafot derive: “Should he spend a maneh on a maneh? From here we learn that one found liable in court does not pay the other’s litigation expenses, even if he caused him to travel to another city.” This position of Tosafot was cited by many Rishonim.[16]

A dissenting view, obligating the losing party to pay travel expenses, is cited by the Meiri, although he himself rejects it: “Some say that if the creditor compels the debtor and later demands reimbursement of his expenses, he may do so.”

The Meiri, however, strengthens the exemption: “This does not appear correct to me… for otherwise how could they have exclaimed rhetorically, ‘Should he spend a maneh on a maneh?’”

Even if the claim ultimately proves baseless, the plaintiff would not be liable for dragging the defendant to a distant location and causing him expenses. In common Beis Din terminology this means that the defendant may request in certain situations “Achar HaNitvah” – but this does not exempt the defendant from paying any Beis Din fees.

3. Defining Court Expenses vs. Litigant Expenses

In defining the distinction, the Maharshal (Yam Shel Shlomo, Bava Kama 10:14) writes: The determining factor is for whose benefit the action was taken. If it benefits the plaintiff, who seeks to recover his funds, he cannot demand reimbursement. A person who acts for his own benefit cannot charge another for it. However, one must pay for expenses incurred for his own benefit or caused by his own actions (e.g., a siruv or cherem - a writ of excommunication due to refusal to appear).

4. Enactments Regarding Legal Expenses

The procedural regulations of the Chief Rabbinate (1960) state: “Every ruling shall include a decision as to who bears court expenses. Where attorney’s fees are to be awarded, the amount shall be specified.” Rabbi Mordechai Eliyahu (PDR 3:14) explained that clearer enactments should be established to avoid uncertainty and claims of kim li.

Later regulations (1993) expanded this authority, explicitly empowering courts to award legal expenses, including filing fees, witness costs, translation, attorney’s fees, and other expenses deemed appropriate. Which is always in the power of the Dayanim in each case, based on halacha.

A. Secondary question that we will answer here in this arena is regarding contractual agreements and their fees.

B. Contractual Undertaking to Reimburse Legal Expenses

Any contractual undertaking raises the question of asmachta (an unenforceable conditional obligation; see Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 207). Nevertheless, an agreement to reimburse legal expenses can expand liability, both to additional cases and to expenses beyond strict halachic requirements. Such undertakings may occur in a contract or in a bitrur (arbitration) agreement.

1. Undertaking in a Contract

“And the writ of authorization (adrakhta) and the writ of transfer (achlata) appear to be payable by the plaintiff, since they are for his benefit in collecting his debt, unless he stipulated that the other party would pay all the expenses.” As Rabbeinu Yerucham writes (Meisharim 3:1, cited in Beit Yosef, Choshen Mishpat §14), and so collection-related documents are generally paid by the creditor unless stipulated otherwise. Similarly, the Rivash rules that if one explicitly undertakes a valid contract to pay legal expenses, the condition is binding, as it is a monetary stipulation.

The Maharshal (and see Responsa of the Maharil, New Responsa, §90) however, disagrees, considering such clauses asmachta. He relies on the Rosh, who ruled that expense clauses are unenforceable unless executed with proper kinyan before an important court knowledgeable in the laws of asmachta.

The Shulchan Aruch (CM 61:5) and Rema rule that such clauses are generally considered asmachta and unenforceable, even if the document states “not as asmachta.”

However, the Sma, Shach, Vilna Gaon, and Nesivos HaMishpat qualify that reimbursement reflecting actual loss is enforceable; only exaggerated penalties are asmachta. They distinguish between actual loss and mere lost profits, the latter generally not compensable. The Aruch HaShulchan innovates that loss of fixed, regular income may be considered actual damage and thus compensable.

Summary: Many authorities hold that an undertaking to reimburse actual legal expenses is effective, provided it reflects genuine loss. Lost profits are generally excluded, though some authorities include fixed, predictable income loss.

2. Undertaking in an Arbitration Agreement

Rabbi Avraham Shapira suggested that such obligations be explicitly included in arbitration agreements.

However, Igros Moshe (CM II:26) writes that if the parties already agreed to litigate and only then stipulate that the loser will pay expenses, this may constitute asmachta. Only if executed properly, me’achshav, and before a respectable court, would it be valid.